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1. Introduction 
This paper considers the issue of the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Ireland - that is whether 
discretionary budgetary decisions by the Irish government are influenced by the economic 
cycle.   The balance of evidence in the international literature points to fiscal policy in 
developed countries, including Ireland, being pro-cyclical, with increases in expenditure 
and/or reductions in tax rates occurring when the economy is buoyant and those budgetary 
decisions being reversed when there is a downturn in economic activity.   Such behaviour can 
be attributed to political economy (governments being profligate when times are good and 
tightening the public purse when recessions occur) and other considerations.  Pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy exacerbates the economic cycle and offsets the effects of the automatic 
stabilisers on the budget balance and the economy.    
In recent years, part of the focus in the literature has been on two issues considered in the 
econometric analysis undertaken here.  The first relates to using both ex-post and ex-ante data 
to compare the outcome of fiscal policy with what was intended at the time budgetary policy 
was enacted.  The second addresses the endogeneity that arises between output growth and its 
fiscal components and that can be left unaddressed in empirical studies of the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy (Rigobon (2004) and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007)).    
Unlike other studies in this area, we use data from budgetary material, rather than secondary 
sources, to compare ex-ante policy intentions with what came to pass.   The annual Budget 
documents in Ireland give forecasts for government consumption and GDP growth, thus 
providing the basis for an ex-ante analysis of fiscal policy cyclicality and its comparison to 
measures of cyclicality based on outturn data.    
In assessing the presence, or otherwise, of pro-cyclical behaviour in fiscal policy, controlling 
for endogeneity in econometric estimations is particularly important.   Endogeneity is 
addressed in two ways here.   First, expected current year outturns for GDP and private 
consumption growth rates in the Budget documents provide substitute variables for next 
year’s GDP growth rate forecast to address the endogeneity issue in the ex-ante estimations, 
while lagged outturn values for those variables are used in the ex-post regressions.   
Secondly, the sign and scale of particular parameter estimates denotes the form and 
magnitude of any cyclical behaviour.   Endogeneity, however, results in ordinary least 
squares (OLS) parameter estimates that are biased downwards.   We employ alternative 
estimation procedures to address this issue.   In particular, we use the dynamic ordinary least 
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squares (DOLS) methodology of Stock and Watson (1993) and the Philips-Hansen (1990) 
fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure.   Both approaches have been used for econometric 
inference purposes where endogeneity may arise.
1
   
The paper is structured as follows.   The literature in this area is considered in the next 
section, while section 3 discusses the data and the econometric procedures used.   Section 4 
then presents the empirical results before the concluding section.   We find fiscal policy to be 
pro-cyclical in Ireland on an ex-ante and ex-post basis but that the evidence on whether 
policy is more pro-cyclical ex-ante or ex-post is mixed between there being no difference and 
ex-post policy being the more pro-cyclical.           
2.  Literature Review 
A considerable literature exists on the cyclicality of fiscal policy based on ex-post data.   
Gavin and Perrotti (1997) and Talvi and Vegh (2000) provide evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in Latin American countries and the world economy, respectively.   Arreaza, Sorensen 
and Yosha (1999) observe budget balances tending to be procyclical in OECD countries. 
Lane (2003) considers how cyclicality varies across spending categories and OECD countries 
and shows that both government investment and government consumption are pro-cyclical.   
Balassone, Francese, Zotteri (2010) attribute asymmetry in the cyclical behaviour of the 
budget balance in fourteen EU member states between 1970 and 2007 to its government 
expenditure component.   Both overall and primary budget balances deteriorate during times 
of economic contraction without a corresponding improvement occurring when the economy 
is expanding.  Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) present evidence of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
both developing and high-income countries. 
There have been some studies of the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Ireland.   Lane (1998) 
estimates regressions of a number of fiscal variables on a measure of the economic cycle 
using annual data from 1979 to 1996.   He detects a pro-cyclical pattern in government 
expenditure and concludes that fiscal policy more generally is not counter-cyclical.   Hunt 
(2005) finds government consumption not to be influenced by the cycle while government 
investment is strongly pro-cyclical.   He also considers the relative importance of actual and 
forecast output growth rates (based on Department of Finance and OECD published 
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 See Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) for an example of an application of these techniques to an endogeneity 
issue.  
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forecasts) in determining government expenditure.   His analysis indicates growth forecasts 
having little influence on spending except for government investment.   Benetrix and Lane 
(2012) compare fiscal policy before and after the financial crisis that arose in 2008.  In the 
pre-crisis period, the General Government balance and discretionary government expenditure 
behave in a manner that indicates fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical.   During the crisis years 
(2008-2010), pro-cyclical fiscal policy is also detected.  
Recent years have seen a new dimension to the international literature developing, with 
analyses of both ex-ante and ex-post data.   Fiscal outcomes are compared with initial budget 
plans and both are related to output developments.   The ex-ante budget plans can reveal the 
intended fiscal stance, while the ex-post data indicate what came to pass.   Ex-post fiscal data 
being regressed on real-time output data helps analyse the relationship between the 
information available to policymakers at the time budgetary plans were outlined and the 
actual outcome of the policy.    
Beetsma, Giuliodori and Wierts (2009) review the stability and convergence programmes of 
EU member states and find that implemented budgetary adjustment routinely falls short of 
that planned.    They point out that this is relevant to fiscal surveillance as ex-ante compliance 
with fiscal rules, such as occurs under the Stability and Growth Pact, could be misguided.   
Using data for OECD countries between 1995 and 2006, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) find 
that planned fiscal policy is acyclical for EU member states and counter-cyclical for other 
OECD countries.   EU countries, however, react pro-cyclically to unexpected changes in the 
output gap, while the responses of the other countries are acyclical. 
Based on a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1993-2003, Forni and Momigliano 
(2005) compare ex-post structural budget balances and real-time values for the output gap, 
taken from the OECD Economic Outlook.   They observe a counter-cyclical stance occurring 
during economic slowdowns.   Using a panel of fourteen OECD countries, Bernoth, Hughes-
Hallett and Lewis (2008) find pro-cyclical fiscal policy being evident in ex-post data, while 
real-time data indicate a more counter-cyclical stance.   Cimadomo (2012) shows a counter-
cyclical fiscal stance in the budgetary plans of OECD countries, particularly during the 
expansion phase of the economic cycle.   In a review of fiscal policy analysis based on real-
time data, Cimadomo (2014) assesses the balance of the evidence as pointing to the cyclical 
stance of fiscal policies being more counter-cyclical when real-time data are used rather than 
ex-post data.     
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3.  Data and econometric methodology 
Ireland follows an annual budgetary process with the Budget for the forthcoming year being 
presented by the Minister for Finance to parliament for its approval in the closing months of 
the preceding calendar year.
2
  Since the 1989 Budget, the accompanying documentation has 
included percentage real/volume growth rate projections for Gross Domestic Product (real 
growth rate of which is denoted as 𝑦), public/government consumption (real growth rate of 
which is denoted as 𝑔), and private/personal consumption (real growth rate of which is 
denoted as 𝑝) for the forthcoming year, as well as expected outturns (“nowcasts”) for the 
current year.   The projections for the forthcoming year (made by the Irish finance ministry, 
the Department of Finance) take account of the effects of budgetary changes on GDP and its 
components.
3
 
Forecasts of the output gap have only been a feature of the Budget since 1999, limiting its 
usefulness for econometric analysis.
4
  On the fiscal side, measures of the structural budget 
balance (and its revenue and expenditure components) are also not available before 1999.   
Government consumption, however, provides a suitable fiscal variable for assessing policy 
cyclicality as the growth rate of that expenditure is at the discretion of government.    
Government investment would be another candidate but no forecasts for it are available in the 
Budget books prior to 2002.  
A dataset of nowcasts and forecasts for GDP, government consumption and private 
consumption can then be compiled from Budget documents (also referred to as the Budget 
books) from the 1989 Budget onwards.
5
   In our view, they constitute an improvement on 
                                                          
2
 This has been the practice since the 1998 Budget.   Before that, the Budget was presented later, in the January 
or February of the calendar year to which it applied.   So, for example, the 1997 Budget was presented on 22 
January 1997, while the 1998 Budget was delivered on 3 December 1997.   
3
 The 1988 Budget was the first where the impact of budget proposals on the economic outlook was taken into 
account.   Specifically, the foreword to the section “Economic Background to the [1988] Budget” includes the 
following:  “It should be noted that this year a change has been made in the way in which the section “Outlook 
for the Irish Economy” has been prepared.   Instead of being based on pre-budgetary trends, this section now 
takes account of Budget Day proposals.” 
No specific numerical forecasts for the variables of interest here are included in the 1988 Budget.   In the 1989 
Budget and subsequent Budgets, they are presented in tabular form and provide the ex-ante data used here.  
4
 The output gap is in any case problematic to estimate accurately for a small, open economy such as Ireland, 
which also makes the calculation of the structural budget balance difficult (see Cronin and McCoy, 1999).    
5
 There were two 2009 Budgets, with the first being presented to parliament on 14 October 2008 and a 
supplementary Budget occurring on 7 April 2009.   The latter includes growth rate projections for GDP, 
government consumption and private consumption for 2009, which we use here.   The supplementary Budget 
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using a source such as the OECD Economic Outlook which has been used, for example, by 
Cimadomo (2012) in his cross-country assessment of ex-ante fiscal policy.   While the OECD 
publication can facilitate a panel study by providing a consistent definition of, and common 
source for, variables across countries, the sequencing of OECD forecasts is not necessarily in 
line with domestic budgets.   The forecasts in the Budget books present the Irish 
government’s perception of the economic outlook on which its spending and taxation 
decisions are made (while taking account of the effect of those measures on output).    
Ex-post data for GDP, government consumption, and private consumption growth rates are 
taken from the EU AMECO database.   We use a data sample from 1989 to 2013 in 
estimating the regression equations below.   The initial year is dictated by ex-ante fiscal and 
macroeconomic data being included in the Budget documentation for the first time in the 
1989 Budget.   While ex-post data for 2014 and 2015 are available, those data are excluded 
from the analysis for two reasons.   First, ex-post data, particularly for output growth, will 
only become final with a lag, so it seems appropriate to exclude the most recent estimates.   
Secondly, the GDP outturn for Ireland in 2015 is a distorted measure of output.
6
  It should 
also be acknowledged that part of the difference between ex-ante and ex-post growth rates 
may be due to methodological changes and improvements in data sources over time.   Such 
effects may be stronger the further back in time one goes.    
It is possible that a political bias may enter the budgetary process and could provide an 
unduly optimistic forecast of economic activity in the coming year.   To assess whether the 
Department of Finance’s GDP growth rate forecasts were too rosy or otherwise, those 
forecasts are compared to those in the first Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin 
published after each Budget (and which take account of tax and expenditure changes in the 
Budget).   Figure 1 shows that the two institutions’ forecasts broadly track each over time 
with only a few instances where sizeable differences arise and with some of those having the 
Department of Finance being more pessimistic than the Central Bank. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
did not include updated projected outturns for 2008, so those provided in the initial 2009 Budget are drawn upon 
here.      
6
 In July 2016, the Irish statistical institute, the Central Statistics Office, reported real GDP growth of 26 per cent 
for Ireland in 2015.   This mainly reflected the effects of a level shift in the size of the capital stock in Ireland 
arising from corporate restructuring and balance sheet reclassifications in the multinational sector.  
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For both ex-ante and ex-post assessments, we follow Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008)’s basic 
approach of regressing percentage changes in real government consumption on percentage 
changes in real GDP (or on an instrumental variable).  The beta coefficient (𝛽 ) in the 
regression estimation indicates the cyclicality of fiscal policy: if it is less than zero, policy is 
counter-cyclical; if it insignificantly different from zero, it is acyclical; and if it is greater than 
zero, policy is pro-cyclical. 
The basic ex-ante regression is then: 
𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 =  𝛽𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡      (a) 
Where  𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1  is the one-year-ahead forecast for the real growth rate in government 
consumption in year 𝑡 at the time of the Budget being delivered to parliament (in year 𝑡 − 1), 
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 is the one-year-ahead forecast real growth rate in GDP in year 𝑡 in the Budget, and 𝑣𝑡 
is an error term.   
The basic ex-post regression is: 
𝑔𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡       (b) 
Where  𝑔𝑡 is the ex-post real growth rate in government consumption in year 𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 is the ex-
post real growth rate in GDP, and 𝑢𝑡 is an error term.   
Drawing on Cimadomo (2012), a third regression is also estimated: 
𝑔𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡       (c) 
Where  𝑔𝑡 is the ex-post real growth rate in government consumption in year 𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 is 
the one-year-ahead forecast real growth rate in GDP in year 𝑡 at the time of the Budget, and 
𝑤𝑡 is an error term.   
Estimation of equations (a) and (b) permit an assessment of the ex-ante and ex-post 
cyclicality of fiscal policy, while a comparison of the beta coefficients from (a) and (c) will 
point to whether implemented fiscal policy was more or less pro- or counter-cyclical than 
intended initially.   
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) highlight an important issue in assessing the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy: the endogeneity that arises between measures of national output and fiscal variables 
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that are a component of that output.   An observed rise in both government consumption 
expenditure and GDP, for example, does not necessarily imply that output growth motivated 
government to increase expenditure.   It could be that the greater spending by government 
had an expansionary effect on output, which otherwise could have fallen or been unchanged.   
A positive correlation between discretionary government expenditure and GDP may be a case 
of fiscal policy driving output.   The difficulty with an OLS estimation of the three equations 
above then is that the covariance between the output growth rate and the error term may not 
be zero.    
Different output variables and econometric estimation procedures are used here to address 
this endogeneity issue.   Initially, OLS estimates of equations (a) to (c) are reported.   These 
estimates are of interest in their own right and for comparison with beta coefficients produced 
by other estimation procedures employed here.   Beyond these initial estimations, the 
empirical approach has two distinct features.   First, instruments for GDP growth are 
substituted for it in estimations of equations (a) to (c).   The two instruments chosen are 
available on an ex-ante basis in the Budget material, as well as ex-post.   One is the first lag 
of private consumption growth rate (𝑝).   It is a component of the GDP growth rate but 
distinct from government consumption so that endogeneity between private and government 
consumption is not to be expected, particularly when lagged values of private consumption 
are used.   The other instrument is the first lag of real GDP growth.   It is also unlikely to be 
correlated with the contemporaneous growth rate of government consumption.   For 
equations (a) and (c), it is the nowcast (Budget day forecast) of real private consumption 
growth and real GDP growth for the current year that are used, i.e. 𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1 to 
follow the notation used heretofore.     Consequently, in what follows we use three different 
output/expenditure variables on the right-hand side of the regression estimations. 
The other feature of the empirical approach is the use of alternative estimation procedures.   
The first is two-stage-least-squares/instrumental variable (IV) estimation that follows from 
the employment of two instrumental variables for GDP growth.   Fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS) and dynamic OLS (DOLS) are the two other estimation techniques used to address 
the endogeneity issue. 
As noted by Stock and Watson (1993), possible endogeneity of some of the explanatory 
variables causes second order asymptotic bias in coefficient variables. This issue can 
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particularly arise in small samples. The dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach can be explained in 
the context of the following relationship: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡         (d) 
Where either 𝑥1𝑡 or 𝑥2𝑡 may be endogenous, DOLS involves adding both leads and lags of 
the differenced regressors to the specification to correct for correlation between the error 
process 𝜀𝑡 and the level regressors 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃1𝑗∆𝑥1,𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜃2𝑗∆𝑥2,𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=−𝑘 +  𝜋𝑡    (e) 
An F-test with respect to the 𝛽’s has an asymptotic  𝒳2 distribution. The error term in (e) is 
liable to be serially correlated so the covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients must be 
adjusted accordingly. Therefore, OLS estimates of the residuals are obtained as an estimator 
of 𝜋𝑡  and the serial correlation of 𝜋𝑡 is assumed to be approximated by the following AR (p) 
model 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛾1𝜋𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝜋𝑡−2 + ⋯ 𝛾𝑝𝜋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜎𝑡        (f) 
Equation (f) is then estimated by OLS to achieve coefficient values for 𝛾′s. The estimated 
standard error of 𝜀𝑡  denoted by 𝛿?̂?  as calculated by an OLS regression of (e) is adjusted 
accordingly to 
𝛿𝜋′̂ =
 𝛿?̂?
(1− 𝛾1̂− 𝛾2̂− 𝛾3̂−⋯ 𝛾?̂?)
          (g) 
The modified covariance matrix is this 𝛿𝜋′̂  squared times the inverse of the second moment of 
the regressors of (g). 
Having allowed for correlation between the regressors and the error process and for serial 
correlation, DOLS enables inferences to be drawn on the basis of the adjusted standard errors. 
FM-OLS estimation is concerned with allowing statistical inference within multivariate 
regressions where the regressors have I(1) processes. If in (d), both 𝑥1  and 𝑥2  have the 
following first difference stationary processes 
∆𝑥1𝑡 = 𝜇 +  𝜃1𝑡           (h) 
∆𝑥2𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃2𝑡     
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in which 𝜇 and 𝛼 are drift parameters and 𝜃1𝑡and 𝜃2𝑡 are I(0) or stationary variables, then the 
computation of the FM-OLS estimator 𝛽  is carried out in a multi-stage process, where, 
initially, 𝑦𝑡, is corrected for the long-run interdependence of  𝜃𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡.  
Before turning to the econometric estimates in the next section, forecast errors, that is the 
differences between the ex-post growth rate and the ex-ante/Budget day forecast growth rate 
for the same year, for each of the four variables used in the various estimations are shown 
over the years 1989 to 2013 in Figure 2.   Panel (i) indicates that the ex-post growth rate for 
government consumption is higher than that projected at Budget time in most years, 
suggesting slippage from budgetary expenditure targets.   Moreover, those cases (only five in 
all) where government consumption growth is less than initially projected involve an 
undershooting that is, in average percentage terms, much lower than that recorded in the other 
years, where an overshooting of the Budget forecast growth rate occurs.    
For the measures of output activity, ex-post GDP growth rates are most usually ahead of the 
Budget forecast (panel (ii) of Figure 2), so that the Department of Finance tended to under-
predict output growth.   This may be due to government consumption growth turning out 
higher than expected at Budget time or it could be due to the other components of GDP 
growing more strongly than projected, or both.   Forecast errors for lagged private 
consumption growth (panel (iii)) – one of the instruments for GDP growth - are more 
balanced in number between outturns exceeding or being less than Budget forecast, although 
the outturn growth rate being in excess of target still predominates.   Finally, panel (iv) 
indicates that initial estimates of the GDP growth rate outturn for the current year (the 
nowcast in the Budget) also tend to be less than the final outturn in most cases. 
4.  Econometric Results 
The layout of Tables 1, 3 and 4 are the same.  From left to right, the three columns of results 
report estimates of the beta coefficients from equations (a), (b) and (c), respectively.   In 
panel (i), the right-hand-side variable is real GDP growth (𝑦𝑡), while in panel (ii) it is lagged 
real private consumption growth (𝑝𝑡−1) and in panel (iii) lagged real GDP growth (𝑦𝑡−1), 
with ex-ante and ex-post values of those variables being used as appropriate to the equation 
being estimated.   A common feature of the four tables is that all estimates of equations (a) to 
(c) render beta coefficients that are positive and statistically significant.   Fiscal policy in 
Ireland can then be adjudged to be pro-cyclical on both an ex-ante and an ex-post basis.     
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Looking at each table in turn, equations (a) to (c) were initially estimated by OLS, with the 
results reported in Table 1.   Substituting lagged private consumption growth and lagged 
GDP growth for GDP growth provides higher beta coefficient estimates.   For all tables, Z-
scores are calculated to ascertain whether, for each panel, beta coefficient estimates in the 
second and third columns are different from that in the first.  In both the second and third 
panels, but not in the first panel, the beta coefficients in the second column are each higher 
than that in the first column.   Thus, the evidence from Table 1 is mixed as to whether fiscal 
policy is more pro-cyclical ex-post than ex-ante.   Equation (c) can be viewed as the ex-post 
outturn for government consumption growth being substituted into the left-hand-side of 
equation (a) for the Budget/ex-ante forecast for that variable.   The beta coefficient of (c) 
being higher than the estimate in (a) would point to budgetary slippage having occurred 
during the year consistent with the direction of the cycle.   The Z-score values in the third 
column of Table 1 support the beta coefficient in that column being higher than that in the 
first column.      
The results of the instrumental variable procedure are shown in Table 2.   The beta coefficient 
estimates are higher than those in panel (i) of Table 1.   As can be seen in Table 2, standard 
tests of endogeneity reject the null of exogeneity for the independent variables, suggesting 
that endogeneity in the data is an issue and, thus, poses a difficulty for a standard OLS 
specification.   In Tables 3 and 4, we present the DOLS and FMOLS estimations of the beta 
coefficient.   They share the common features with Tables 1 and 2 that all beta coefficients 
are statistically significant and positive.   The comparison, using Z-scores,  between the beta 
estimates in the first and second columns of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that fiscal policy is more 
pro-cyclical ex-post than ex-ante for four of the six panels involved, with those four being 
where lagged private consumption growth and lagged GDP growth are employed as 
regressors.   All Z-scores point to the beta coefficient values in the third column being higher 
than those in the first.      
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has considered the issue of the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Ireland on an ex-ante 
and an ex-post basis.   Budget books provide the ex-ante data, including for two variables that 
help address an endogeneity issue.   Not only can those variables substitute for GDP growth 
when least squares estimation procedures are used but they also allow an instrumental 
variable procedure to be employed.   Using an instrumental variables estimator, we find 
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evidence that endogeneity needs to be addressed in assessing the issue of the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy in Ireland.   We also use two least-squares estimation procedures, DOLS and 
FMOLS, both of which are typically used to derive inference in cases of potential 
endogeneity.   A benefit of our approach is that numerous (in this case, ten) variable-
estimation procedure combinations are employed in assessing the cyclicality of fiscal policy 
and in comparing ex-ante and ex-post stances.    
The findings are that, first, fiscal policy in Ireland can be adjudged to be pro-cyclical on both 
ex-ante and ex-post bases according to all variable and estimation procedure combinations.   
Secondly, on the question of whether fiscal policy is more pro-cyclical when ex-ante data or 
ex-post data are used, the evidence is mixed with some estimates (in four of the ten cases) 
indicating no statistical difference and others (the remaining six) a larger beta coefficient for 
the ex-post data.   Finally, when ex-post government consumption is substituted for its ex-
ante counterpart in regressions where ex-ante measures of economic activity are on the right-
hand-side, the beta coefficients are larger in nine out of ten cases.   This is interpreted as 
support for fiscal policy being more pro-cyclical than that planned at Budget time. 
These results imply that fiscal policy in Ireland is pro-cyclical, consistent with some of the 
findings in Lane (1998), Hunt (2005), and Benetrix and Lane (2005).   Such a fiscal stance is 
undesirable because it indicates budgetary policy exacerbating the growth cycle when it 
having no effect or a counter-cyclical effect would be preferable.   What is new among the 
findings here is that budgetary policy is pro-cyclical at the time Budgets are presented to 
parliament.   This contrasts with international studies such as Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) 
and Bernoth, Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2008) where ex-ante fiscal policy is found to have 
an acyclical or counter-cyclical stance in OECD countries.       
Ireland exited the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2015 with its preventive 
arm now applying.   This requires the setting of a medium-term objective of a balanced 
budget in structural terms and adherence to an expenditure benchmark, constraining spending 
by the potential growth rate of the economy.   Adherence to these rules will be assessed 
formally on an ex-post basis.   The analysis on the historical data conducted here indicates 
that a change in fiscal behaviour from that of the past may be required for Ireland to observe 
the Pact’s requirements over time.   If future fiscal policy were to be pro-cyclical in nature 
then its effect would be to cause the structural budget balance to start to move away from the 
medium-term objective once that target had been initially attained.   Expenditure growth 
  
11 
 
could also rise above benchmark values at times, such that a breach of the spending ceiling 
could occur.   Finally, the data here point to a greater degree of pro-cyclicality in fiscal policy 
occurring after the Budget than was planned in it.   If maintained over time, this would 
increase the susceptibility of the sovereign to an infringement of the Pact rules.             
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Figure 1. Department of Finance and Central Bank of Ireland GDP growth rate 
forecasts (%) 
 
Source: Department of Finance annual Budget material and Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly 
Bulletin.  
Note: The Central Bank of Ireland GDP growth rate forecast is taken from the first Quarterly Bulletin 
published after the Budget.    
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Figure 2.  Forecast Errors, 1989-2013 (%)  
i. Government consumption growth   ii.      GDP growth  
  
iii. Lagged private consumption growth   iv.    Lagged GDP growth  
  
 
 
Source: Department of Finance annual Budget material for ex-ante data; EU AMECO for ex-post 
data. 
Note: In panels (i)-(ii), forecast errors are calculated as the ex-ante real/volume growth forecast for 
the Budget year in question less the ex-post real/volume growth outturn for the same year.   In panels 
(iii) and (iv), forecast errors are the real-time Budget day expected outturns for real private 
consumption growth and real GDP growth, respectively, in the pre-Budget year less their ex-post 
outturns.    
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Table 1.   OLS Regression Results, 1989-2013 
  Dependent 
variable 
 
 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 𝑔𝑡 
  Beta coefficient 
estimates 
 
(i)    
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 0.415 
(0.131) 
  
𝑦𝑡  0.642 
(0.132) 
 
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1   0.916** 
(0.136) 
𝑅2 0.305 0.507 0.664 
(ii)    
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.547 
(0.082) 
  
𝑝𝑡−1  0.88** 
(0.0973) 
 
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1   0.86** 
(0.11) 
𝑅2 0.65 0.788 0.73 
    
(iii)    
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.449 
(0.0976) 
  
𝑦𝑡−1   0.765** 
(0.096) 
 
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1      0.852*** 
(0.096) 
𝑅2 0.479 0.743 0.774 
Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors of coefficient estimates.   *** indicates coefficient 
estimate being statistically different from entry in 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 column at 1 per cent significance level; ** at 
5 per cent level; * at 10 per cent level.    
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Table 2.   Instrumental Variable Regression Results, 1989-2013 
  Dependent 
variable 
 
 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 𝑔𝑡 
(i)    
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 0.466 
(0.176) 
  
𝑦𝑡  0.8 
(0.140) 
 
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1   0.96 
(0.249) 
    
𝐻𝑂: Variable is Exogenous 
F-Test 4.85 
(0.04) 
5.77 
(0.03) 
3.05 
(0.09) 
    
𝒳2 3.2 
(0.07) 
5.12 
(0.02) 
2.23 
(0.14) 
    
First-stage regression summary statistics 
   
                              𝑅2 0.95 0.73 0.95 
    
Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors of coefficient estimates.    
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Table 3.   DOLS Regression Results, 1989-2013 
  Dependent 
variable 
 
 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 𝑔𝑡 
(i)    
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 0.680 
(0.125) 
  
𝑦𝑡  0.889 
(0.096) 
 
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1      1.279*** 
(0.110) 
𝑅2 0.6 0.92 0.94 
(ii)    
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.613 
(0.091) 
  
𝑝𝑡−1   1.095*** 
(0.099) 
 
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1     1.028*** 
(0.107) 
𝑅2 0.78 0.87 0.88 
    
(iii)    
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.572 
(0.106) 
  
𝑦𝑡−1   0.889** 
(0.098) 
 
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1    1.025*** 
(0.096) 
𝑅2 0.56 0.83 0.86 
Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors of coefficient estimates.   *** indicates coefficient 
estimate being statistically different from entry in 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 column at 1 per cent significance level; ** at 
5 per cent level; * at 10 per cent level.    
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Table 4.   FMOLS Regression Results, 1989-2013 
  Dependent 
variable 
 
 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 𝑔𝑡 𝑔𝑡 
(i)    
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1 0.564 
(0.113) 
  
𝑦𝑡  0.801 
(0.095) 
 
𝑦𝑡|𝑡−1      1.104*** 
(0.100) 
𝑅2 0.29 0.54 0.67 
(ii)    
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.591 
(0.063) 
  
𝑝𝑡−1    0.957*** 
(0.095) 
 
𝑝𝑡−1|𝑡−1       0.895** 
(0.094) 
𝑅2 0.53 0.56 0.83 
    
(iii)    
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1 0.516 
(0.091) 
  
𝑦𝑡−1     0.863** 
(0.086) 
 
𝑦𝑡−1|𝑡−1       0.933*** 
(0.076) 
𝑅2 0.49 0.73 0.78 
Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors of coefficient estimates.   *** indicates coefficient 
estimate being statistically different from entry in 𝑔𝑡|𝑡−1 column at 1 per cent significance level; ** at 
5 per cent level; * at 10 per cent level.    
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